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 1 
It is rare that so much can change in such a short time as with the postsocialist system 
transformation, usually considered to have taken place within the period between 1989 
and the present. Some believe that the transformation in the case of the ten East Central 
European countries already belonging to the European Union1 has succeeded, because 
the region has institutionally matured to a full-blooded market economy. Others, 
however, are of the opinion that there is still a long way to go. 
I tend to share the latter view. Even though the very fact of formal membership in the 
European Union—in accordance with the Copenhagen Criteria established as early as in 
1992—means that a new member is a ‘functional market economy’ able to compete 
within the European integration grouping, it does not determine true system maturity. 
The only reasonable criterion of such maturity is the qualitative advancement of the 
market culture sensu largo and the reliability of institutions, i.e., the rule of market 
economy game that ensures the effective operation of mechanisms of creating and 
allocating capital as well as division of the output. In talking about the effective 
operation of those mechanisms, one needs to bear in mind both the dynamics and the 
balance of economic processes. Therefore, in order to achieve a state of market 
institutions and culture which would be satisfactory from this particular point of view, 
further development is necessary and this will take many years. 
As for the other regions, if it were not for the general transformation process, there are 
countries, especially in the post-Soviet Central Asia, that would not be called 
postsocialist, or even as countries reforming their systems. After all, in 1989 Hungary, 
Poland or Yugoslavia were already at that time much more marketized and liberalized 
than countries such as Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan are twenty years later. 
However, at that time, the former countries were not called ‘transformation economies’, 
because of context, just as the latter now are not referred to as ‘reforming socialist 
(communist) economies’, also because of the context. 
1 The  cascade 
In the spring of 1989 the historic Round Table debate in Poland was crowned with a 
compromise. Contemporary authorities and opposition oriented towards reform and 
development, as well as intellectuals and businessmen, politicians and economists were 
represented at the debate. This agreement became the catalyst for the great system 
transformation. It covered a great part of the world: first, Eastern Europe, and soon 
after, the territories of the former Soviet Union. That impulse also had considerable 
influence on the market orientation and speed of the structural and institutional 
transformations in China and in the Indochina regions, particularly in Vietnam.  
All in all, over thirty countries, stretching from the Elbe River to the Pacific Ocean and 
currently inhabited with over 1.8 billion people, more than one-fourth of the world’s 
population, have embraced the path to a more or less liberal market and democratic 
transformation. Twenty years later, this transformation process—evolving against the 
background of globalization and a scientific and technical revolution as well as stormy 
                                                 
1   Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. 2 
cultural and political changes—has not only brought about a different face to this part of 
world but has also created a completely new world.  
It is true all the more because the year 1989 was a historically significant date for many 
other regions of the world as well—from South and Central America through Africa and 
the Middle East to South and Eastern Asia. It can be observed, inter alia, in such 
diverse countries as Chile and Nicaragua, Ghana and South Africa, Yemen and Syria, 
India and Sri Lanka.  
The turnaround, which was made more radical by the year 1989 (more radical, because 
many elements of that turnaround had, to various extents, evolved earlier, preparing 
particular countries for the transformation (Bąk 2006; Koźmiński 2008)) also meant the 
end of the cold war. This meant the end of the clash on both sides, i.e. the ‘first world’ 
(advanced capitalist countries led by the USA and the former colonial metropolitan 
countries) and the ‘second world’ (led by the USSR and China) on the territory of the 
‘third world’ countries. It is interesting to note that twenty years later, China’s influence 
is much greater and still growing. In some parts of the differently divided world, it is the 
greatest.  
The most important accumulation of factors to cause the cascade of cultural, political, 
social, economic, technological and environmental transformations include the collapse 
of real socialism, end of the cold war, the postsocialist transformation and the expansion 
of neoliberalism, the markets ‘emerging’ from the postcolonial and postsocialist 
countries, the increasing wave of the contemporary phase of globalization, the 
information revolution, mass migration and devastation of natural environment.   
It is true that we are always confronted with the merging and mutual influence of the 
processes of continuity and change. Yet, occasionally a simultaneous accumulation of 
changes can create a specific cascade. However, historic processes are not linear in 
character. This is what is taking place now: things happen as they do because much is 
happening at the same time. The cascade of changes through societies and economies is 
rolling with such great force that its contact with nature, culture and technology could 
be called a tectonic shift. A new quality is being created, which can be explained on the 
basis of coincidence theory of development (Kolodko 2010). And it is against this 
background that the process of postsocialist market transformation, per se historic, 
should be perceived. 
2 The  sentence 
If we had asked people, including outstanding economists (proficient in the fields of the 
economic growth and development process and well aware of the realities of the 
countries referred to as postsocialist since 1989) to predict the average standard of life 
and production level after two decades of transformation (excluding China and 
Indochina, where development is very specific), no-one would have answered that it 
would be only 20 per cent higher. A prediction of a GDP growth index at the level of 
120 per cent after two decades of system transformation would be construed as finding 
the great change pointless from an economic point of view. Why transform the existing 
system if it only sentences the next generation (400 million people) to a rickety pace of 
growth that averages 0.9 per cent per annum?! And yet that is what was done… 3 
Twenty years ago, no-one would have risked the seemingly ridiculously forecast that 
China would increase its GDP per capita not by one fifth but five times. Yet, the huge 
country, still deemed by some as communist, has increased its production level by more 
than 420 per cent by following its chosen path. China also chose to ignore pressures and 
advice from the west, unlike the countries of Eastern Europe and some republics of the 
former Soviet Union, which have accepted them in different periods and to different 
extents. China has been able to ensure the perfect cooperation of an invisible hand of the 
market and a visible head of state. The synergy of those two regulators of the social 
reproduction process has determined China’s unprecedented success, as the country   
gently progressed from the phase of reforming socialist planned economy to gradual 
creation of capitalist market economy. Although China still does not admit that and is 
nowadays advancing the theme of constructing ‘a harmonious society’, the country, 
intentionally still socialist, is in fact already on the path of building market economy. 
And the latter is capitalist by nature, with all the long-term implications, including 
political ones. 
There will never be a satisfactory answer to a counterfactual, or alternative history 
question: what would have happened if…? What would have happened if China had 
followed the path of chaotic political and economic liberalization, like Russia did in the 
decade of Yeltsin’s administration? Would it have a bigger population than it has now 
and a lower standard of life than in 1989, while at the same time flooding the world with 
additional tens of millions of miserable migrants?  
What would have happened if, first in Eastern Europe, beginning with Poland, and then 
in the Soviet Union, political conditions for complex, profound system transformations 
had not appeared, and if this part of the world had followed a path of gradual but 
effective market reforms, like China and Indochina did, instead of the rapid postsocialist 
transformation as they did? We can speculate that it would have been better and the 
pace of growth in the 1990-2009 period would have been significantly faster than the 
miserable average of 0.9 per cent yearly, as it actually was in the previous twenty-year 
period (1970-89) and even to a greater extent, in two earlier decades (1950-69). 
But it can also be assumed that as a result of the crisis at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s 
and the systemic ineptitude to adapt the path of fast and balanced growth, those 
countries would have faced secular stagnation and could possibly now have an even 
lower production level than then. However, if we take into consideration the 
engagement in market reforms at the end of 1980s, especially in Hungary and Poland, as 
well as Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika, the first option seems more probable: a 
higher average pace of growth than what has really taken place. 
Certainly, in the realities of more profoundly reformed socialism, however shaped, 
redistribution mechanisms would have also worked differently. The range of income 
inequality would surely have been greater than during the so-called real socialism, yet 
smaller than it has really been (Kolodko 2000; Tomkiewicz 2007).  But, that 
supposition can be questioned as well, as the Chinese and Vietnamese experience 
proves otherwise. In these countries, advanced reforms of socialist economy system 
have triggered a gradual yet greater increase in the scale of inequality than in countries 
which chose gradual transformation. Suffice it to say that Gini index, illustrating the 
level of income differences, is 0.47 in China (2007) and 0.37 in Vietnam (2004), while 
in Poland it is 0.35 (2005) and in Hungary only 0.28 (2005) (CIA 2009). 4 
3 Reforms  versus transformation 
There is a substantial difference between the market reforms of a real socialism 
economy and a postsocialist market transformation. In the former case, it is about 
changing the way the present system functions in order to retain it. Attempts to make 
the system more flexible and increase its ability to adjust to the changing cultural and 
technological conditions were made in support of this goal. The purpose was to enhance 
the effectiveness of the companies and to gain social support, or at least acceptance, for 
the functioning of the system. So, in the case of reforms, the changes—although at 
times profound and advanced—were to serve the purpose of retaining the economic and 
political system, not to reject it. That was the objective of the Soviet perestroika at the 
end of the 1980s; that was the objective of Polish reforms during the same decade (Baka 
2007); that was the meaning of the transformations started in Hungary in 1968; and that 
was the basis of a different Yugoslavian model of self-government socialism, initiated 
as early as in 1950s.  
As for the second option—postsocialist transformation—its aim is to eliminate the 
former system and replace it through substantial, qualitative institutional reconstruction 
by a new system, which is, de facto, a market capitalist economy. The fact that the term 
‘capitalism’ is still surprisingly rarely used to refer to the system created in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union does not change anything. Although euphemisms 
such as ‘market economy’ are more frequently used, their capitalist nature is obvious. 
Besides, it is not mere fate that former ‘communism’ with all its disadvantages, also 
imaginary ones, is contrasted with ‘market economy’, with its advantages, some of 
which are only hypothetical. Such an intentional (ideologically-motivated, practically 
meaningless but politically useful) contrast of non-existent gloomy ‘communism’ with 
the idealized ‘market economy’, actually also the non-existent, is erroneous from a 
methodological point of view and factually confusing. Proper comparisons necessitate 
confronting existing realities—the past and the present—and not a slandered image of 
the past and coloured image of the present or imagined future. 
Therefore, the so-called real socialism as it truly was, especially in its economic aspect, 
and the so-called real, contemporary postsocialist capitalism, as it actually is, should be 
juxtaposed (Główczyk 2003). What is amazing is that neither economists nor economic 
historians are yet ready to make such an objective, comprehensive comparison. So we 
must wait for it, maybe another twenty years or more…  
4 Emerging  markets 
The term, emerging markets, commonly used (and misused to refer to the postsocialist 
reality without necessary reflection), was not created to describe the new, complex 
economic reality of countries under systemic transformation. Another neoliberal 
concept, the term is related to the expansion of the neoliberal model of capitalism, 
lasting over the same time as the now twenty-year episode of postsocialist 
transformations (Harvey 2005). These ‘emerging’ markets are not appearing, evolving 
and maturing market economies, civic societies or political democracies but emerging 
new fields of economic activity, particularly speculation, for the richer part of the world, 
the one which ‘emerged’ long ago as a capitalist economy and has institutionally and 5 
financially matured to become so strong and affluent that it can—and will—use that 
affluence also elsewhere, in addition to its traditional fields of domination. Considering 
the map of the world before 1989 with the division as it existed then, the situation called 
for the non-market part of the world to ‘emerge’ and open up for capital penetration. 
That, in turn, was and still is possible only through the transformation from a socialist 
planned economy to capitalist market economy. 
From this neoliberal point of view, ‘emerging markets’ are instrumentally treated as one 
more opportunity to do good business, without necessarily taking into consideration the 
social costs to the places where business is done. But from the point of view of the 
countries and economies interested in ‘emerging’, the purpose is basically different: it 
has the appearance of a market economy system, effective and competitive on the 
world’s scale, which would be able to fulfil satisfactorily the needs of their own 
societies. 
That, briefly, is the fundamental difference between the neoliberal approach to 
postsocialist systemic transformation and the one represented by social market 
economy. The first approach concentrates on emerging opportunities to do business. 
One should not be surprised with this but it is necessary to understand it and react 
properly. The other approach concentrates on creating and developing a new type of 
social bond, based on new market management principles. Hence, it is not just ‘markets’ 
that emerge, but a market economy based society. And that is something quite 
different…  
Therefore, the declared western concern for democracy and progress, for the 
development and wealth of the postsocialist societies is mainly rhetorics, covering the 
concern for self-interests, not only political but foremost economic interests, particularly 
those of the financial elites of rich countries. We should not take offence at this fact, but 
failing to realize it would be naїve. We need to learn to adjust to it in practice as if to a 
new challenge, which (such as producing a mutually dependent world economy in the 
globalized era, after the advancement of liberalization and integration of markets) 
creates not only new dangers and risks but also more new opportunities. However, in 
order for it to be beneficial from the point of view of long-term social and economic 
development, an effective strategy that outlines the aims of development and one that is 
based on an accurate economic theory, is necessary.  
With respect to the historical sentence mentioned above, it was inevitable when one 
takes into consideration the dialectics of the whole development process. But its 
magnitude still needs to be a subject of serious reflection and debate, as well as reliable 
assessment, both in political and strict scientific terms.  
It was inevitable because, over two decades ago, the real socialism system—with the 
economy functioning in a vacuum lacking political democracy and based on state 
property domination, central capital allocation and bureaucratic control—was heading 
towards its demise, because it had used up its development capacity. People were more 
and more dissatisfied with the role they played in all three social functions (Kolodko 
1984): 
–  Producers: frustration was increasing, resulting from wrongly organized 
production that failed to bring the expected effects; 6 
–  Consumers: in the face of increasing deficiencies and deepening shortageflation 
syndrome (Kolodko and McMahon 1987), the level of consumer satisfaction was 
relatively low (despite increasing production), or at times extremely low, because 
it was difficult not only to earn money but also to spend it; 
–  Citizens: the so-called people’s democracy and the more or less liberalized one-
party system limited possibilities of the people to express opinions in an 
organized and creative way and to have an impact on public matters. 
In this situation, when the system was clearly creating more problems than it was able to 
solve, ‘material fatigue’ was so great that the system was bound to collapse under the 
weight of its own disfunctionality. It happened in 1989 and in subsequent years, 
although it could have happened a few, or even a dozen, years earlier or later. But it 
definitely had to happen: first, under the increasing social pressure, most obvious in 
Poland, expressed mainly although not exclusively by the Solidarity movement, which 
in time contradicted itself and turned to populist or neoliberal positions (Ost 2005). It 
was also in Poland that the authorities, oriented at reforms, first understood the dilemma 
and decided to share power at the Round Table. In Romania, in contrast, the reaction 
was completely different. In other countries, the forms of the process varied between 
these two extremities. 
Obviously, external pressures played a role here, yet transformation was basically an 
internal process. External pressure, however, should not be overestimated, because 
instead of imposing the direction or pace of the changes, external forces took advantage 
of the internal decomposition processes. Even if power in the USA had been in the 
hands of the Democrats, with their conciliation and cooperation attitude and kindness 
towards reforming the system and looking for ‘socialism with a human face’, instead of 
being with the Republicans with their confrontational outlook; even if the power in 
Great Britain had been with Labour Party, who preferred to concentrate on social 
market economy and to look for the ‘third way’, instead of the Tories, who perceived 
the East with hostility, the real socialism was still doomed to fail. If it had not happened 
at the end of the 1980s, it would have happened a bit later. But it was not doomed to 
what followed over the next two decades and to what is, to a great extent, still taking 
place.  
5 Facts,  interpretations,  speculations 
The past may be a matter of facts and their interpretation but the future—except for 
shaping it actively, which is the most important—is speculation and its interpretation. 
The former is more difficult; the latter is more appealing, as the future knows no facts. It 
will provide them. However, the kind of facts to come will greatly depend on the 
assumptions taken ex ante and their consequences: theoretical and practical, intellectual 
and political ones. Therefore, hypothetical deliberations on the future, with certain 
intellectual and formal limitations, are not only interesting but may also be creative and 
fertile. Those, who do not speculate, cannot predict things. And without predictions, 
participation in creating the future is not possible. 
Assessment of the previous stage of postsocialist transformation process is still 
controversial, and is going to be so for many generations, if not forever. Yet, certain 
areas of theoretical generalizations, hard to undermine rationally, are appearing 7 
(Blanchard 1997; Csaba 2007). At the same time, there seems to be a shared consensus 
that more could have been achieved in terms of economic growth, although there are at 
times fundamental controversies as to the paths that could have led to it. There is, 
however, no doubt that twenty years after the transformation, its results, measured as the 
scale of economic growth, could have been much greater and its social costs 
(unemployment, inequalities, margin of exclusion, poverty, excessive death rate, etc.) 
could have been substantially smaller. A similar observation is going to be noted in the 
future. 
In the face of neoliberal propaganda, aimed at presenting a false path of transformation 
(one without an alternative) ex ante and its image ex post, attempts at estimating the 
economic growth that could have occurred in the years 1990-2009 are rare. Obviously, 
even an accurate result of such a complex estimation with reference to production and 
consumption growth cannot provide a satisfactory assessment of the existing situation 
because the GDP (gross domestic product) category used does not cover all aspects of 
the socioeconomic situation. UNDP’s human development index (HDI) is better, albeit 
not perfect. But it also ignores such issues as the question of natural environment or the 
evaluation of free time and its use. In time, these and other aspects of socioeconomic 
development (cultural values and evaluation of the relations between the exercise of 
power and the functioning of economy) will receive due attention in a synthetic way, for 
example, in the form of Integrated Well-Being Index (ZIP: Zintegrowany Indeks 
Pomyślności) (Kolodko 2010). 
Let us take Poland as an example. It is the biggest economy among the new EU member 
countries and its GDP in 2009 was equivalent to approximately 180 per cent of its 1989 
value. China and Vietnam excluded, this is the best result among the postsocialist 
countries, apart from a specific case of Turkmenistan where the index is about 220 per 
cent (EBRD 2008), bumped up by a boom in energy resources prices in the recent years. 
It must be added that Poland’s 80 per cent growth in GDP has basically happened due to 
fast growth during 1994-97 as well as during the second half of 2002 to mid-2008. 
Aggregated GDP growth during 1990-93 and 1998-2001 was, in contrast, close to zero. 
These changes in dynamics and level of production were clearly correlated to the 
employment and unemployment rates (Figure 1). 
There has been an attempt to estimate the hypothetical pace of growth over the past 
twenty years in Poland, based on the assumption that changes in the level of GDP 
during 1990-93 could have complied with the original government’s plans (a fall of 3.1 
per cent in 1990, followed by further growth) and changes in 1998-2001 could have 
matched the real dynamics achieved in the 1994-97 period, also predicted by the 
contemporary government’s policy ex ante (Kolodko 2009). This could have been 
possible, because implementing such a scenario required only that the obvious mistakes 
be avoided: first, the devastating stabilization policy at the beginning of the past decade 
(Kolodko and Nuti 1997); second, unnecessary cooling of the economy at the end of the 
decade, when the pace of growth was brought from the maximum (considering the 
transformation period) level of 7 per cent in 1997 to the stagnation level of 0.2 per cent 
at the end of 2001 (EBRD 2008). 
Had the events followed this scenario, Poland’s GDP level in 2009 could have achieved 
not merely 180 per cent of the value two decades ago, but half as big again: over 280 
per cent! This, of course, would have been conditional on the sound policy of building 
market institutions and a responsible strategy for economic development, and Poland’s 8 
more effective reaction to the 2008-09 global economic crisis to retain the GDP 
dynamics at about 4-5 per cent. 
Figure 1 
From shock without therapy to therapy without shocks in Poland, 1990-2008 
Note:  GDP growth (left scale) and unemployment rate (right scale). 
Source:   GUS (Central Statistical Office), Warsaw (various years). 
 
Figure 2 
What if… Poland's GDP growth in 1990-2009 (1989=100) 






























Source:   Data for real GDP growth from GUS (various years). Figure for 2009 based on author’s forecast. 
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Presented in absolute values, it would mean not around 18,000 dollars per capita 
(calculated according to the purchasing power parity, $PPP), as in Latvia, but over 
28,000 $PPP, more than in Portugal. This illustrates the range of the unexploited 
possibilities and, at the same time, irretrievably lost income. Failure to reach the income 
that could have potentially been achieved, with all its ensuing results, is the effect of the 
neoliberal economic policy applied in some periods.  
The range of mistakes was even greater for the other transformed economies. Taken 
together, these economies did not reach to the 1989 production level until 2007, and the 
failure to take advantage of their growth potential was even more significant. Various 
causes, usually political rather than economic in character, the virtually never-ending 
political disputes, alternating between a populist and a neoliberal stance, made it 
difficult to exercise rational and practical policy of balanced economic growth.  
Still, it must be emphasized that Poland’s average rate of growth per annum was not 
destined to be three per cent, as a pace of approximately 5 per cent could have been 
achievable.  
Similarly, the transformation countries as a group were by no means doomed ex ante to 
the slow 0.9 per cent pace of growth. Fundamental mistakes in economic strategy, both 
with reference to structural changes and in creating the new institutions needed for the 
efficient functioning of market economy, and to economic policy sensu stricte, triggered 
high costs. The price now being paid is the relatively lower competitiveness of 
companies and the relatively lower standard of life as well as excessive foreign debt and 
dependence on external capital and politics. 
Will we have to pay a similar price in the future, too? Let us hope not, though we cannot 
be sure, given the slowness of the process of learning from our own mistakes. The 
observed inertia partly results from the postsocialist establishment’s attachment to 
ineffective doctrines, and partly from the pressures put forth by national and foreign 
lobbies to secure their particular interests. 
In 2008, the ten postsocialist member countries of the EU were inhabited by 103 million 
people, which is 1.53 per cent of the world’s population. They accounted for about 1.86 
trillion $PPP in GDP, which is 2.6 per cent of gross world product (GWP) and at the 
same time 12.4 per cent of gross product of the whole European Union. It must be 
emphasized that it is relatively less—yes, less, not more—than twenty years ago. It is 
indicative of the fact that the pace of production growth over the period 1990-2009, 
both on the global scale and in the wealthy part of the world, including the western part 
of the EU, has been much higher than in the postsocialist countries. 
Nevertheless, in the next twenty years (2010-29), it can and should be different. 
Postsocialist economies, even in the current decade at least until the outbreak of the 
world crisis, have demonstrated much greater dynamics than the highly developed 
countries, thus partly compensating for the difference between these countries. 
Enormous institutional progress, combined with technological advancement and raising 
qualifications and managerial skills of the employees, is resulting in a faster pace of 
labour productivity growth than in the west. That tendency, accompanied by further 
enhancement of the quality of microeconomic management, should continue in the 
future. But obviously, it also requires an effective macroeconomic policy, as 
microeconomic changes alone are not sufficient.  10 
The year 2009 and the subsequent years will be characterized by great uncertainty, 
related to the spread of the successive stages of the world crisis (Orłowski 2008). It is 
difficult to make a reasonable forecast on the economic dynamics of the next few years 
against such a background. Yet, the entirety of the long-term analysis of systemic 
changes suggests that in the long run, postsocialist economies have the basis, related to 
global politics, institutions, culture, populations and technology, to grow much faster 
than the ‘old’ members of the European Union. 
In the long-lasting process of eliminating historical differences in development levels, 
each fraction of a percentage point counts, as compound interest works with the passing 
of time. But first of all, the proper strategy of long-term, fast economic growth must 
work. It must be based on a new pragmatism (Kolodko 2010) that is removed from the 
threat of populism and from neoliberal deviation of market economy. Particularly 
dangerous for economic balance and dynamics is the combination of the two, which still 
sometimes happens in postsocialist countries.  
6 The  future 
Let us analyse the example of Poland once again to look into the future. Currently, just 
as in 1989 and the subsequent years, we are facing ex ante the opportunity of being able 
to follow various economic growth paths. These range between a very high average 
annual level of growth about 5 per cent (but one not impossible to achieve) and about 3 
per cent, which from the point of view of possibilities and, especially, ambitions, is low. 
Let us see, then, how big is the difference between the estimated GDP level in another 
twenty years, 2029. We base our analysis at a 3 per cent rate of growth (the actual rate 
as it was in 1990-2009), and at 5.4 per cent, the rate that could have been achieved in 
the same period if the economic policy mistakes, especially shock without therapy at the  
 
Figure 3 
Alternative scenarios for Poland's GDP growth in 2009-2029 
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Source:   Author’s calculation. See text for explanation.  11 
beginning of the previous decade and unnecessary cooling and over-killing at the end of 
it, had been avoided. It seems that the 5 per cent growth rate may be possible under 
certain conditions in the next two decades, but the fundamental importance here is that 
long-term strategy be based on proper economic theory (Figure 3).  
If all the ten postsocialist countries in the European Union maintained the fast growth rate 
of 5.4 per cent for the next twenty years, ceteris paribus, their total GDP in 2029 would 
be 5.33 trillion $PPP, nearly three times more than now. Assuming that for the same time 
the average annual growth rate of world GDP would be about 3.5 per cent (which implies 
only 2.5 per cent per each global resident), and that it will not exceed 1.5 per cent for the 
fifteen ‘old’ EU countries, in another two decades the GDP of the ten postsocialist 
countries will grow from the current 12.4 per cent in the EU and 2.6 per cent in the world, 
to around 30 and 3.8 per cent respectively, which would strengthen the relative position of 
the Eastern Europe region.  
It needs to be added that by 2029, the remaining ten postsocialist countries probably will 
have joined the European Union. This includes all the Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) and some post-
Soviet republics (Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine). In 2008, their total GDP was 729 
billion $PPP (half of which, 360 billion, is Ukraine). The GDP of these ten countries 
represents, respectively: 39.2, 4.9 and 1 per cent of the total product of the ten countries 
already in the European Union, the whole Union, and the entire world. Aggregated for 
seven Balkan countries and three post-Soviet republics against a different background, the 
GDP, calculated according to purchasing power, is slightly higher than Poland’s GDP 
(729 and 685 billion $PPP, respectively) (Table 1). 
Table 1 
Population and GDP (in $PPP) in Central and South Eastern Europe, 2008  
Country  Population (in million)  GDP (in billion $PPP)  GDP per capita (in $PPP) 
    
Bulgaria 7.3  95.9  13,200 
Czech Republic  10.2  273.7  26,800 
Estonia 1.3  28.6  21,900 
Hungary   9.9  205.7  20,500 
Latvia 2.2  41.6  17,800 
Lithuania 3.6  65.8  18,400 
Poland 38.5  684.5  17,800 
Romania 22.2  278.4  12,500 
Slovakia   5.5  123.1  22,600 
Slovenia 2.0  61.8  30,800 
EU-10 103  1,859  18,100 
   
Albania 3.6  23.1  6,400 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  4.6  30.5  6,600 
Croatia 4.5  73.4  16,900 
Kosovo 2.1  5.0  2,300 
Macedonia 2.1  19.0  9,200 
Montenegro 0.7  7.2  10,600 
Serbia 10.2  83.1  8,200 
Belarus 9.7  116.7  12,000 
Moldova 4.3  10.8  2,500 
Ukraine 46.0  359.9  6,900 
     
SEE-10 87.7  728.6  8,300 
ECE-20 190  2,588  13,600 
EU-27 491  14,960  34,000 
World 6,707  70,650  10,500 
Source:  CIA (2009) 12 
Starting from a lower level, the GDP of the European postsocialist economies still 
outside the EU may in the future grow faster than in the relatively more advanced 
countries. Therefore, the assumption of its threefold growth until 2029—up to around 2 
trillion $PPP—seems realistic. Then, GDP of all the twenty postsocialist European 
countries (the ten already in the Union and the ten that should join it with time) would 
be approximately 5.3 per cent of the world’s production. The world’s population will 
then be around eight billion, while there will be more or less the same number of people 
in Eastern Europe as now, i.e. 190-200 million. So the one-fortieth of the global 
population (or 2.5 per cent of all mankind) will produce one-twentieth of GWP. 
Currently, the populations of Central and Southeastern Europe, accounting for 2.84 per 
cent of the global population, produce about 3.7 per cent of the global GWP. 
The most important thing is, however, that with the optimistic scenario of annual GDP 
growth of 5.4 per cent for the ten postsocialist countries already in the European Union, 
its  per capita value would increase by as much as 34,000 $PPP (from the current 
average of 18,000 to 52,000 by 2029), which means nearly 190 per cent per head, as the 
number of residents will remain fairly stable at the current level. But it would be good if 
these people could at least enjoy higher output and consequently, a perceptibly higher 
standard of life, which is what the meaning of postsocialist systemic transformation 
should boil down to, not mistaking the means of action with its end, as it sometimes 
happens. 
7 Conclusions   
In conclusion, answering the questions: Could it have been better? Will it be better?, it 
must be said that yes, it obviously could have been better—to various extents in various 
countries, in various fields for particular individuals and social groups. It could have 
been better if the objectives had been more accurately defined and the systemic 
transformation had not been perceived as a self-contained aim but rather as an 
instrument to achieve a more superior goal—fast socioeconomic development to enable 
the country to make up for its historical lags (Kolodko 2002).  
Will it be better? In the absolute sense, of course yes. In the next two decades of 
transformations, the level of production and consumption will double and in some cases 
even triple. In twenty years, will GDP per head in the new postsocialist member 
countries of the EU be around 50,000 $PPP? This is not very probable with regard to all 
the 100 million people residing in this part of Europe, but it is possible that certain 
countries and regions (more and more often, one needs to think in terms of regions, not 
countries), will able to achieve economic success. Where success will occur, it will 
mean more than the GDP that at present accrues to the residents in the fifteen ‘old’ 
countries of the European Union. Even though these fifteen EU member states will 
grow, increasing their production and consumption at least by one-third, the gap 
between the countries of eastern Europe and of western Europe will diminish, but in 
many cases those differences even in twenty years will be substantial, still causing 
social tensions and political problems.  
The situation may not relatively become better: subjective opinion is not based on an 
assessment of improvements between the past and the present, nor on the smaller gap in 
the comparison with more affluent societies and richer parts of the world, but 13 
predominantly on the self-evaluation of one’s individual, group, social and national 
situation, as it is perceived in relation to one’s desires, expectations and ideas. There is 
no doubt that they will always be higher than the opportunities for their fulfilment and 
realization. What is important is that they will be the driving force for further change 
and development on the one hand, but also the reason for endless frustration, on the 
other. 
Taking into consideration the very dynamics of growth and development and the 
progress to be achieved in the future in those fields, the reality will still be worse than it 
need be. As usual, the available potential will not be utilized fully, for the same reason 
as was apparent during the previous twenty years. The period is also bound to be full of 
mistakes in economic policy, reflecting badly solved conflicts of group interests, and 
inaccurate theoretical assumptions and, more generally, theory falling behind reality and 
endless problems, concerning, first, the crystallization of the general aim of 
development, and then its disaggregation into partial aims. This is how it has been, this 
is how it is now, and this is how it will be. 
The conclusions derived from the preceding years, should help to reduce the gap 
between potential possibility and actual reality for the next two decades, 2010-29. 
However, even in 2029, just as in 1989 and in 2009, there will be people who will 
answer the question, When at last will it be better?, with the sarcastic retort: It’s been 
already… 
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